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THE SOCIAL INSURANCE CRISIS AND
THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE SAVING:
A COMMENTARY ON SHAVIRO’S
RECKLESS DISREGARD
David I. Walker*
Abstract: Long-range Social Security and Medicare spending projections
vastly exceed projected program revenues. If left unchecked, the resulting
ªscal imbalance (estimated at $40 to $70 trillion in present value terms)
would fall primarily on future generations. To avoid generational inequity, and perhaps ªscal meltdown, Professor Daniel N. Shaviro and
others propose immediate ªscal austerity. This reply Commentary argues
that near-term austerity is unlikely to play a signiªcant role in overcoming
the ªscal imbalance, which can be thought of as a balloon payment due
in the mid-twenty-ªrst century. Signiªcant near-term ªscal austerity would
eliminate the public debt and replace it with a public surplus. Political
economy theory and U.S. public debt history suggest that this path is
infeasible. This Commentary also stresses the importance of disaggregating the “Social Security and Medicare” problems. Contrary to popular
belief, Medicare is by far the larger problem, and the Medicare imbalance
is driven by projected spending increases, outpacing overall economic
growth indeªnitely. These observations suggest that a focus on Medicare
cost control, rather than revenue enhancement, is called for.

Introduction
Despite a projected social insurance ªscal crisis resulting from
increased longevity and rising healthcare costs, the Bush administration has continued to advocate tax cuts and recently has sponsored
and signed an unfunded prescription drug entitlement, exacerbating
the current deªcit situation. In Reckless Disregard: The Bush administration’s Policy of Cutting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, Professor Daniel N. Shaviro argues that rather than decreasing the size of
the government through limiting discretionary spending as the Bush
administration apparently hopes, the growing deªcits and ªscal gap
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. For their valuable suggestions and contributions, I would like to thank my colleagues Alan Feld and Ted Sims, as
well as the participants in the symposium in which these papers were presented.
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(the present value of projected expenditures over revenues) will result
in an enormous intergenerational transfer that actually represents
larger government and unfairly burdens future generations with the
cost of providing the baby boom generation with a secure and healthy
retirement.1 Professor Shaviro argues that the Bush administration
and Congress should reverse course and exercise ªscal restraint.2
This reply Commentary focuses on two issues that, although tangential to Professor Shaviro’s analysis, ultimately relate to both his fairness and size of government arguments. First, commentators routinely
speak of a “Social Security and Medicare” problem in the singular, but
it is important in evaluating potential solutions and in considering Professor Shaviro’s “size of government” argument to disaggregate the programs.3 Contrary to popular belief, Medicare is by far the larger problem, and the Medicare ªscal gap is driven largely by projected spending
increases, outpacing increases in gross domestic product (“GDP”) for
many years to come.4 This suggests that Medicare may be an appropriate “big government” target and that cost control should be the focus
of our attack.5
Second, it is questionable whether near-term ªscal austerity is
likely to have much bearing on the ultimate solutions to our social insurance problems or on how the burden of those solutions is divided
among present and future generations.6 To reduce the burden on future generations in a meaningful way through near-term ªscal austerity
would require a combination of tax increases and spending cuts that
would replace the public debt with a near-term public surplus.7 The
United States’ history of public (dis)saving and political economy theory suggest that this strategy is infeasible, at least within the current
budgetary framework.8 We cannot “save” our way out of these problems, and thus, we should begin curtailing future beneªts today.9

1 See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration’s Policy of Cutting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1285 (2004).
2 See generally id.
3 See infra notes 13–32 and accompanying text.
4 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1299, 1302–03.
5 See id.
6 See infra notes 34–61 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 40–51 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 52–62 and accompanying text.
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I. The Problem
Professor Shaviro eloquently described the problem facing us,
and this section will reiterate only a few key points. As a result of increased longevity, escalating healthcare costs, and the impending retirement of the baby boomers, our pay-as-you-go social insurance programs will not be sustainable under current funding and spending
rules. The Congressional Budget Ofªce (the “CBO”) has projected
combined Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid spending to rise
from 8% of GDP in 2004 to 9% by 2012, 17% by 2040, and 25% by
2075.10 These obligations do not show up in snapshot deªcit and public debt ªgures; in fact, Social Security and Medicare currently are
producing surpluses which mask the size of the “rest of government”
deªcits.11 Recent analyses, however, put the “ªscal gap”—the current
public debt plus the present value of projected non-interest expenditures minus projected revenues under current law—at $44 to $74 trillion.12 This shortfall is almost entirely attributable to the social insurance funding gap and dwarfs the actual public debt, which at the end
of 2003 was about $4 trillion.13
This path is not sustainable and ultimately must result in a combination of tax increases and spending cuts. In addition, unless soon reversed, the ªscal imbalance will result in an unprecedented transfer of
wealth from future to current generations. One can think of the situation as pay-as-you-go ªnancing with an enormous balloon payment (on
the order of $40 to $70 trillion) accruing interest and due in, say, 2050.
10 See Cong. Budget Ofªce, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years
2005 to 2014, at xiv ( Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Budget and Economic Outlook] (providing estimate for 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4985/01-26BudgetOutlook-EntireReport.pdf; Alan J. Auerbach et al., The Budget Outlook and Options for
Fiscal Policy, 95 Tax Notes 1639, 1648 (2002) (providing Congressional Budget Ofªce
(“CBO”) projections based on the January 2002 budget forecast). Recently, the CBO has
provided the following “intermediate spending path” forecast for combined Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid spending as a percentage of gross domestic product
(“GDP”): 9% in 2010, 14.3% in 2030, and 17.7% in 2050. See Cong. Budget Ofªce, The
Long-Term Budget Outlook 7 (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter Long-Term Budget Outlook]; available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4916/Report.pdf. These ªgures
are roughly consistent.
11 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 12 tbl.1-6 (reporting 2003 Social Security and Medicare trust fund surpluses of $156 billion and $8 billion, respectively).
12 See Jagadeesh Gokhale & Kent Smetters, Fiscal and Generational Imbalances:
New Budget Measures for New Budget Priorities 27 tbl.2 (2003) (estimating the ªscal
gap at $44 trillion); Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1299 (estimating the ªscal gap at $74 trillion
based on the “ºow” ªscal gap calculation provided in Auerbach et al., supra note 10). In both
cases, expenditures and funding are projected into perpetuity.
13 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 3 tbl.1-2.
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The question is whether those working in 2050 and beyond can and
should bear this entire burden, or whether and to what extent those
working and those retired today should bear a share through increased
taxes, reduced beneªts, or both. (Of course, previous generations also
contributed to this problem, but it is too late to do anything about that.)
II. Disaggregating “Social Security and Medicare”
If the U.S. government stays on the present course, spending
soon will overwhelm funding for both Social Security and Medicare,
but the problems under the two systems actually have quite different
dimensions. Whether viewed in terms of its share of the ªscal gap or
its growing share of total federal expenditures, Medicare is by far the
larger problem, and Medicare is a much longer-term problem than
Social Security.
In a 2002 study, Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters estimated
that 83% of the long-term ªscal imbalance was attributable to Medicare and 16% to Social Security.14 Remaining federal programs were
basically in balance. There are two problems, however, with this analysis.15 First, although Medicare Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance) is funded through participant premiums and transfers from
general funds rather than through payroll taxes, Gokhale and Smetters include only the premium receipts in calculating the Part B gap.16
This approach could be viewed as overstating the overall Medicare
imbalance, but this is not too serious a problem because the ªscal gap
attributable to Medicare Part A alone is almost three times the size of
the Social Security gap.17 Second, and more important, dividing the
imbalance between Social Security and Medicare could be considered
arbitrary, at least on the funding side. Most Americans do not distinguish between payroll taxes dedicated to Social Security and those
dedicated to Medicare.
Thus, it may be more appropriate to focus solely on expenditures, although the outcome is much the same. The CBO recently
projected that spending for Social Security, absent changes, will rise
14 See Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 25; see also Ronald Lee & Ryan Edwards,
The Fiscal Effects of Population Aging in the U.S.: Assessing the Uncertainties, in 16 Tax Policy
and the Economy 141, 162 ( James M. Poterba ed., 2002) (estimating that only about
one-eighth of projected growth in federal spending is attributable to retirement programs including Social Security).
15 See Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 25.
16 See id. at 29.
17 See id. at 26 tbl.2.
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from 4.2% of GDP in 2003 to 6.2% of GDP in 2050.18 At that point,
however, few of the baby boomers will still be living, and Social Security spending through the rest of the century would be basically ºat.
Because of the tie to actual healthcare expenditures, Medicare
cost projections are much more uncertain. Under their “middle-cost
scenario,” however, the CBO projects Medicare spending to increase
from 2.4% of GDP today to 8.3% in 2050.19 Medicare cost increases,
moreover, are expected to continue to outpace GDP growth for the
remainder of the century, leading Ronald Lee and Ryan Edwards to
conclude that retirement programs, including Social Security, will account for only about one-eighth of the growth in federal spending
over the twenty-ªrst century, with healthcare for the elderly accounting for the bulk of the rest.20
Public perception of the relative magnitude of the Social Security
and Medicare problems appears to be exactly the opposite of reality.
Friends and colleagues whom I have queried uniformly believe that
Social Security represents the larger problem, and that was my view
before embarking on this project. It is interesting to consider brieºy
why this misperception exists. New York Times columnist Paul Krugman
essentially blames a vast right wing conspiracy that is attempting to
scare Americans into accepting privatization of Social Security by
lumping the programs together and making the ªscal situation look
more desperate than it is.21 But, if so, why have defenders of Social
Security not made more of the fact that this discrete program is relatively solvent? Perhaps liberals believe it will be easier to save Medicare
by tying its fate to a more politically popular Social Security program.
Whatever the reason for the common misperception, recognizing
that Medicare represents the lion’s share of the social insurance problem in this country has important implications. Unlike Social Security,
the Medicare problem is driven in large part by real growth in expenditures, is relatively distant, and, as a result, is more uncertain.22 As
18 See Long-Term Budget Outlook, supra note 10, at 19.
19 See id. at 32.
20 See Lee & Edwards, supra note 14, at 162.
21 See Paul Krugman, Social Security Scares, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2004, at A23.
22 Projected Medicare cost growth is about equally attributable to demographic shifts
and to growth in real spending per enrollee, estimated by the Medicare Trustees to outpace
per capita GDP growth by one percentage point annually through 2080. See Long-Term
Budget Outlook, supra note 10, at 4–5; Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 23.
Although a relatively small part of the overall story, the Social Security situation better
exempliªes the picture painted by Professor Shaviro. According to Gokhale and Smetters,
the Social Security ªscal imbalance is attributable entirely to past and current generations.
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Professor Shaviro observes, Social Security payments are pure cash
transfers that have little allocative effect on the economy.23 Medicare,
however, is another story. Again, as Professor Shaviro notes, “Its incentive and income effects have surely been huge contributors to the
enormous growth of healthcare expenditure, both absolutely and
relative to the economy, in recent decades.”24
That growth indeed has been enormous. Total national health
expenditures (“NHE”) have grown from 5.1% of GDP to 14.1% between 1960 and 2001.25 The differential growth rate has slowed in recent years, but even in the last decade, average annual NHE growth
exceeded GDP growth by 1.5%.26 In addition, Medicare spending has
grown more rapidly than private healthcare spending, with Medicare
costs increasing from 4.1% of total NHE in 1967 (the year of Medicare’s inception) to 17% in 2001.27 Of course, a large part of differential Medicare growth can be attributed to demographics, but even on
a cost-per-enrollee basis, Medicare cost increases continue to outpace
both GDP and overall NHE growth rates.28 The 1% excess growth rate
projected by the Medicare Trustees would actually be a signiªcant
improvement over recent history: between 1980 and 2003, Medicare
spending growth outpaced GDP growth by 2.3 percentage points.29
The history and projections suggest two conclusions. First, efforts
to manage the Medicare ªscal gap should be focused on the expenditure side of the equation. Second, and related, Medicare is an appropriate “big government” target. Professor Shaviro argues that, rather
than decreasing the size of government by limiting spending as the
Bush administration seems to hope, the intergenerational redistribuThe present value of payroll tax contributions by future generations actually exceeds the
present value of their receipts. See Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 28. Thus, it
appears that pay-as-you-go Social Security ªnancing would be sustainable going forward.
This also suggests that if the Social Security beneªts of current retirees and the baby
boomers ultimately are curtailed to some extent, this would not be generationally unfair.
Past and current retirees and the baby boomers simply failed to fund the system adequately. Of course, signiªcant beneªt reductions could create tremendous hardship and
may be politically infeasible, but compared with massive tax increases down the road,
beneªt cuts would increase generational equity.
23 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1317.
24 See id. at 1318.
25 Long-Term Budget Outlook, supra note 10, at 4.
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 See id.; see also Lee & Edwards, supra note 14, at 171 (arguing that the most important sources of uncertainty in Medicare spending forecasts are fertility rates and excess
growth rates).
29 See Long-Term Budget Outlook, supra note 10, at 4.
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tion that inevitably will arise under current policies actually represents
larger government.30 Frankly, however, this is not the kind of “big
government” issue that Republicans salivate over. A public Medicare
system comprising 8% or more of GDP is.
The other notable aspect of the Medicare situation is that the
Medicare balloon payment facing future generations largely is attributable to funding and spending imbalances that will occur after current
generations are gone.31 As a result of the persistent differential between
the projected growth in Medicare costs and GDP, only about 40% of the
present value difference between projected expenditures and revenues
is attributable to past and current generations.32 Forty percent is a large
burden to pass on to future generations, but even if one is skeptical of
our ability to rein in Medicare costs, generational fairness does not require living generations to account for the entire Medicare ªscal gap.
III. The Problem of Collective Saving
Part II of this Commentary demonstrates that the U.S. social insurance crisis is largely a Medicare crisis and suggests that expenditure
control is the most promising avenue of attack, but it does not explain
why closing the gap through increased funding is not equally plausible.33 This Part illustrates why signiªcant pre-funding of future social
insurance obligations through near-term ªscal austerity is unrealistic.
Returning to the balloon payment analogy, one can envision
projected ªscal obligations as funded through a pay-as-you-go system
plus a $40 to $70 trillion balloon payment accruing interest and due
mid-twenty-ªrst century.34 Short of an economic miracle, it is extremely difªcult to imagine mid-twenty-ªrst century taxpayers paying
off this balloon on their own, and even if they could, the result would
be generationally unfair. If Congress were to institute a signiªcant
program of ªscal austerity today, we conceivably could spread that
burden over several generations, thus reducing the risk of a ªscal
meltdown and increasing generational fairness. Our public
(dis)saving history and the political economy of public saving, however, suggest that near-term ªscal austerity is unlikely to play a
signiªcant role in alleviating the burden on subsequent generations.
30 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1313–23.
31 See Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 29.
32 See id.
33 See supra notes 13–32 and accompanying text.
34 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining the balloon payment analogy).
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A. Building a Public Surplus
At the end of 2003, the public debt stood at just under $4 trillion.35
Professor Shaviro cites two recent studies placing the “stock” ªscal
gap—the present value of future tax increases or spending cuts needed
to maintain the public debt at the current fraction of GDP—at $44 to
$74 trillion, ten to almost twenty times the current debt, and notes that
these estimates fail to reºect the latest round of tax cuts and the new
Medicare prescription drug beneªt.36 No one suggests, of course, that
we catch up all at once. In 2002, Alan Auerbach, William Gale, and Peter Orszag projected that a permanent combination of tax increases
and spending cuts amounting to 11% of GDP was necessary to close the
ªscal gap.37 This was the level of austerity needed, according to that
projection, to maintain the public debt at the current fraction of GDP
over the long term, and maintaining a stable ratio of debt to GDP over
the long term is required to keep the cost of servicing that debt from
overwhelming the non-interest portion of the budget.38
Moreover, every year of delay in implementing austerity increases
the ultimate pain. If Congress does not act until 2012, the required
combination of perpetual tax increases and spending cuts necessary
to eliminate the ªscal gap in Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag’s most plausible scenario would rise from 11% to 12.6% of GDP.39 Although not
expressly stated, Professor Shaviro presumably believes that we should
reverse course immediately and institute a ªscal austerity program on
this order.
The situation has worsened since Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag published their 2002 study. The passage of an unfunded Medicare prescription drug beneªt must have increased the ªscal gap substantially. Ignoring this increase, however, and using the ªgures discussed above,
imagine if Congress were to enact a combination of tax increases and
spending cuts amounting to 11% of GDP today and to maintain this
program in perpetuity. Because the large increases in ªscal demands
35 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 3 tbl.1-2.
36 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1293. Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters provided
the $44 trillion ªgure. Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 27 tbl.2. The $74 trillion
ªgure is calculated by Professor Shaviro and based on Alan Auerbach, William Gale, and
Peter Orszag’s projection of the “ºow” ªscal gap described below. See Auerbach et al., supra
note 10, at 1644 tbl.4; Daniel N. Shaviro, The Growing U.S. Fiscal Gap, World Econ. J.,
Oct.–Dec. 2002, at 2–3.
37 See Auerbach et al., supra note 10, at 1644 tbl.4; Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1293.
38 See Long-Term Budget Outlook, supra note 10, at 3.
39 See Auerbach et al., supra note 10, at 1649.
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are not projected to occur for twenty or thirty years, we would rapidly
build a public surplus. Unless this surplus were somehow sequestered
from the general public debt calculations, by 2007 the public debt
would be eliminated entirely. By 2014 our current $4 trillion public
debt would be replaced with a $10 trillion public surplus.40 Ultimately,
this collective savings bubble would be drawn down as the baby boomers retire, but is the creation of this savings bubble feasible within the
conªnes of our current budget and social insurance structures? Our
national public (dis)saving experience says no.
B. Empirical Evidence on Public (Dis)saving
This nation has carried a public debt consistently since its inception.41 The United States never has been in a surplus situation, although we came close to eliminating the debt in the 1830s.42 Over the
last forty years public debt has swelled dramatically in nominal terms,
from $250 billion to almost $4 trillion, but debt as a fraction of GDP
has been relatively steady, ranging from about 25% to 50% of GDP
and averaging about 36%.43 Moreover, annual budget surpluses have
been rare, occurring only ªve times during this forty-year period.44 As
an empirical observation, it would seem that the federal government
is inexperienced, to the say the least, at creating public nest eggs.
One might think, however, that the Social Security and Medicare
trust funds have been a mechanism for increasing public saving. In
recent years, payroll tax receipts have far outpaced Social Security and
Medicare drawdowns, resulting in signiªcant increases in the trust
funds. At the end of 2003, the combined trust fund balances exceeded $1.8 trillion.45 The trust funds, of course, are no more than
40 Calculations based on data from Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10,
at 3 tbl.1-2.
41 See Bureau of the Pub. Debt, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Historical Debt Outstanding—Annual 1791–1849, at http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdhisto1.htm
(last updated Jan. 31, 2001).
42 See id.
43 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 129–30 tbls.F-1, F-2.
44 See id. The only meaningful surpluses occurred between 1998 and 2001 and largely
were attributable to the economic boom of the 1990s.
45 See Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Total Medicare Income, Expenditures, and Trust Fund Assets During Fiscal Years 1970–2012, at http://www.cms.
hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/2003/tabiia2.asp (last modiªed Sept. 17, 2004) (presenting data from Bds. of Trs., Fed. Hosp. Ins. & Fed. Supplementary Med. Ins. Trust
Funds, 2004 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital
Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds 3 tbl.I.C1
(2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/2004/tr.pdf);
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inter-governmental accounting entries. The trust fund balances are
“invested” in government securities, but the T-bills, notes, or other
securities representing the trust fund balances are not set aside. They
simply represent an “I.O.U.” from the federal government’s general
revenue to the social insurance systems. The projections suggest that
if we remain on our current path, the trust funds will be exhausted in
twenty-two years (Medicare) to thirty-eight years (Social Security).46
The narrow question, however, is whether the existence of these trust
funds and recent large balances have had any effect on public saving.
Apparently, they have not. In 1985, the combined trust fund balances stood at $74 billion, less than 2% of GDP.47 The total public debt
at the end of that year was $1.5 trillion, 36% of GDP.48 At the end of
2003, the trust fund balances were $1.8 trillion, representing about
17% of GDP.49 Total public debt was $3.9 trillion at the end of last year,
again about 36% of GDP.50 The 15% of GDP increase in the trust fund
balances appears to have been completely offset by other tax cuts or
spending increases. Put another way, if the government were to borrow
enough money to fund fully (and to segregate) the trust fund balances,
public debt would jump to 53% of GDP.51 Eyeball empiricism suggests
that the massive increases in the Social Security and Medicare trust
funds have had no impact on the overall level of public debt.
C. Is Collective Saving Feasible?
If actual dollars need to be set aside (instead of simply passed between generations in a pay-as-you-go system) to promote generational
fairness or to avoid a social insurance crisis in the future, it is not clear
Soc. Sec. Admin., Trust Fund Data: Old Age, Survivors, & Disability Insurance
Trust Funds, 1957–2003, at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4a3.html (last updated Feb. 12, 2004) (presenting data from Bd. of Trs., Fed. Old-Age & Survivors Ins.
& Disability Ins. Trust Funds, The 2004 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees
of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust
Funds 4 tbl.II.B1 (2004), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/tr04.pdf).
46 See Soc. Sec. & Medicare Bds. of Trs., A Summary of the 2004 Annual Reports,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/trsummary.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
47 See Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., supra note 45; Soc. Sec. Admin., supra note 45; see also Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 139 tbl.F-11 (reporting 1985 GDP as $4.1 trillion).
48 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 139 tbl.F-11.
49 See Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., supra note 45; Soc. Sec. Admin., supra note 45; see also Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 139 tbl.F-11 (reporting that GDP at the end of 2003 was $10.8 trillion).
50 See Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10, at 139 tbl.F-11.
51 See id.
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that a collective approach to saving is superior to individual saving, or
that a collective approach is even feasible. Individuals may suffer from
myopia, but they have strong incentives to ensure their own well-being.52
Individuals who accurately assess their future needs can save for the future with relative security. It is possible that their savings will be eroded
by inºation or conªscatory wealth taxation, but generally, they get to
spend in retirement what they set aside today, as well as the earnings on
those funds. Thus, they have every incentive to plan and to save.
Collective public saving, however, is more problematic. First,
myopia does not disappear in the public setting. Perhaps the Bush
administration’s apparent indifference to the coming ªscal crisis reºects public myopia. The Bush administration may be irrationally optimistic about the prospects for economic growth (despite the fact
that much of the budget grows with GDP), or it may believe that
technical innovation ultimately will reduce the costs of healthcare.
In fact, individual myopia likely is magniªed in the public sphere.
Professor Shaviro and others urge abandoning a myopic ªxation with
current deªcits, debt levels, and ten-year budget outlooks, but I have
yet to see a public ofªcial campaigning on a net present value budget
analysis platform, and the salience of deªcit and debt ªgures cannot
be ignored.53 If anything, the evidence suggests worsening public
myopia as sunset provisions are added to tax legislation to improve
the optics of cuts while attempting to tie the hands of future Congresses.54 Few people would manage their own household budgets in
this fashion. People may be individually myopic, but they do not simply ignore budgetary issues more than ten years out.
Second, collective public saving could be viewed as a collective
action problem. Why should I agree to pay more taxes today and help
build a collective nest egg, when other generations may shirk their
obligations or divert the surplus we have built to Mars exploration or
foreign wars? The shirking problem is particularly acute because the
ªscal demands do not peak for many years.55 The Bush administration’s policies may reºect shirking instead of, or in addition to, myo52 Social Security and Medicare can be seen as a response to individual myopia. If individuals tend to be unrealistically optimistic about enjoying good health or high investment
returns in the future, they may save too little in purely private retirement and retiree insurance programs.
53 See Gokhale & Smetters, supra note 12, at 1–6; Auerbach et al., supra note 10, at
1648, 1653–54; Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1289–94.
54 See Auerbach et al., supra note 10, at 1645.
55 See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text for an explanation of the projected
increased costs of U.S. social insurance programs.
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pia, and shirking would not be irrational here, because there is no
way to bind future generations to a course of ªscal restraint.
Third, in crass political terms, the problem with collective saving
is that future generations do not vote. Our pay-as-you-go system has
worked effectively for as long as it has because the political muscle of
the current beneªciaries was fairly well balanced against that of current earners and payers. Even if a considerable fraction of voters is
foresighted and altruistic, this is unlikely to offset the effect of (rationally) selªsh voters. Simply put, can we imagine the U.S. Congress
sitting on a public surplus of $10 trillion in order to smooth out the
social insurance cost bubble? I think it is extremely unlikely that surpluses would survive to meet the social insurance funding needs of
future generations, and I suspect most taxpayers and voters would
share my cynicism.56
Building a public surplus is probably not politically feasible. In
fact, it would be a tremendous victory for ªscal austerity if we were to
reduce the public debt to 25% of GDP by 2014. But this would entail a
combination of tax increases and spending cuts of less than $2 trillion
over the ten-year period against the CBO budget baseline, or perhaps
$4 trillion against a more realistic baseline projection including certain
2001 and 2003 tax act extensions.57 Austerity of this magnitude would
appear to be lost in the round of calculations of the impending ªscal
gap of $44 to $74 trillion.58 It seems unlikely, then, that near-term ªscal
austerity will have much to do with how we deal with our social insurance crisis.
D. The Road Ahead
It is disappointing, but not surprising, that the current administration continues to push tax cuts and spending increases in the face
of looming Social Security and Medicare insolvency. This is sympto56 My colleague Alan Feld suggested that the biblical story of Joseph and the Pharaoh’s
dream would provide a very useful analogy here, and I quite agree. In the Bible, Pharaoh
dreams of seven lean cows swallowing seven fat cows and seven lean ears of corn swallowing seven fat ears. See Genesis 41:1–57. Joseph interprets the dream to mean that Egypt will
enjoy seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine, and Pharaoh puts Joseph in
charge of grain management. Joseph builds storage facilities and stockpiles grain during
the seven years of plenty. As predicted, seven years of famine follow, and Egypt is well prepared. Id. The moral of the story for our purposes is that storing grain is a great solution if
you do not have to worry about rats.
57 Calculations based on data from Budget and Economic Outlook, supra note 10,
at 3 tbl.1-2, 91.
58 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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matic of the difªculty of collective saving, and I would not expect to
see signiªcant ªscal austerity under a second Bush or even a Kerry
administration. So, what can, should, or will be done?
The most likely scenario is that little will be done over the next
ten to twenty years and that we will maintain public debt at about 35%
of GDP, while the projected ªscal imbalance continues to grow. This
scenario is troubling, but perhaps not as dire or unfair as Professor
Shaviro suggests. Ultimately, beneªts will have to be cut and taxes
raised, but this scenario puts the most pressure on Medicare spending, which is the biggest part of the problem. Inevitable cuts in the
baby boomers’ beneªts may cause some hardship, but their voting
strength will limit the hardship, and the beneªt cuts will not be generationally unfair. The biggest problems in this scenario are that the
working generation mid-century is likely to face very high tax rates
and public debt will be pushed to untested limits.
A more responsible approach would be to begin curtailing future
social insurance beneªts now. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan recently made such a proposal, and such action might be politically feasible if the cutbacks do not affect current retirees.59 Curtailing
future beneªts today would tend to shift some of the burden borne by
mid-twenty-ªrst century workers in the “do nothing” scenario to the
baby boomers, thus increasing generational fairness.
The most responsible, and generationally fair, approach would be
to begin curtailing future beneªts today and to shore up funding. As
discussed above, I am extremely skeptical of our ability to pre-fund future obligations within the current Social Security and Medicare structures.60 It is conceivable that the political economy problems could be
overcome through substantial reform that results in effective sequestration of the trust funds from the “rest of government” accounts or even
privatization, but it is unlikely. It is more promising, therefore, to focus
efforts on the spending and beneªt side of the equation.
IV. The Impact on “Big Government”
Before closing, let me respond brieºy to the principal point emphasized by Professor Shaviro in the present Article. He argues that
the intergenerational redistribution that is inevitable if we do not
change course should be viewed as “big government,” just like direct
59 See Edmund L. Andrews, To Trim Deªcit, Greenspan Urges Social Security and Medicare
Cuts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2004, at A1.
60 See supra notes 33–56 and accompanying text.

1360

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 45:1347

government spending, and that, as a result, the present course leads
to larger, not smaller, government.61 I agree in theory, but I am not
persuaded fully by the argument for several reasons.
First, it is unclear how to weigh the distributional effects of intergenerational transfers against the allocational effects of direct government involvement in programs like Medicare. I am sure, however,
how the Bush administration would weigh them. They would consider
the projected Medicare excess growth rates (relative to GDP growth) a
classic “big government” issue.
Second, in adding up the various allocational and distributional
effects, we should recognize that near-term ªscal restraint also has “big
government” implications if restraint results in a public surplus. Suppose Congress does begin building a public surplus that reduces intergenerational redistribution. Professor Shaviro believes this will forestall
an increase in the size of government, but we also must consider the
size-of-government effects of the public surplus administration apparatus.62 Currently, the Social Security and Medicare trust funds are “invested” in government securities. The fund managers are bookkeepers, and management costs are low. In a world of public surpluses,
funds would have to be invested in non-governmental securities, which
would require an elaborate investment management apparatus.
Collective public surplus management may be more efªcient
than private investment management, but this efªciency advantage
does not address sufªciently the “big government” concern. If we envision the same level and distribution of collective savings taking place
within a purely public system, a mixed public/private system (for example, mandatory individual accounts), or a purely private system,
the allocative effects may be the same, but the governmental thumbprint and big government charge will loom largest in the ªrst scenario. My intuition is that the size of the government is more that just
the sum of its allocational and distributional effects. One also must
consider the degree of interference with individual autonomy.
Finally, it is worth noting that discretionary spending already is
coming under pressure as a result of growing deªcits and public
debt.63 Clearly, discretionary spending cuts cannot cure the ªscal imbalance, but if the Republican Party is to retain the mantle of the
61 See Shaviro, supra note 1, at 1304–05.
62 See id.
63 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Economic View: Managing the Deªcit with Plans to Spend,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2004, at C4 (reporting that growth in domestic discretionary spending
would be held below inºation under the recently promulgated House Budget blueprint).
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party of ªscal responsibility, it must regain its focus on direct government outlays in general, and discretionary spending in particular.
Conclusion
Professor Shaviro’s article adds to a long list of signiªcant contributions he has made to our understanding of Social Security, Medicare, and the tax systems. I certainly share Professor Shaviro’s concern
with the outlook for U.S. social insurance and the burden we appear
to be creating for future generations, and I agree with much of his
analysis. Our differences lie in emphasis as much as substance.
In this Commentary, I have attempted to demonstrate the importance of disaggregating the Social Security and Medicare problems.
Disaggregation is complicated by the fact that payroll taxes are somewhat arbitrarily divided between the systems, but clearly, Medicare
represents the larger problem. This matters because Medicare’s projected excess growth rates cry out for an expenditure-side solution,
and the signiªcant allocational effects of Medicare suggest that it is a
legitimate “big government” target.
I also have argued that near-term ªscal austerity, although desirable for a host of reasons, is unlikely to have much impact on the resolution of our long-range social insurance crisis. I reach this conclusion
simply because the current public debt is such a small part of the
long-term ªscal gap that we would have to create a sizeable near-term
public surplus to have any real impact. History and political economy
theory suggest that this is unlikely to happen. Of course, we should
not dig a deeper hole for our descendents to ªll, but it seems more
proªtable to focus on gradually reducing social insurance beneªts
and controlling costs than attempting to improve social insurance
funding.
Professor Shaviro’s argument that deªcits are unlikely to reduce
the overall size of government, if we take into account the redistributional effects of massive intergenerational transfers, is provocative and
certainly could be correct, but the calculus is complex and largely ignores the role of individual autonomy. Even ignoring non-economic
effects, however, one cannot predict which path—near-term ªscal austerity or starving the beast—results in “bigger government.” Thus,
when thinking about deªcits, debt, and the growing ªscal gap, I fall
back to consideration of what is efªcient, fair, and achievable. That
analysis is difªcult enough.
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